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Judicial Review in Venezuela*
Allan R. Brewer-Carias'
INTRODUCTION

Judicial review of constitutionality 1 is the power assigned to the
courts to decide upon the constitutionality of statutes and other
gorvenmental acts; therefore, it can only exist in legal systems in
which there is a written and rigid Constitution, imposing limits to
the state organs, and particularly to Parliament. That is why judicial review of the constitutionality of state acts has been considered as the ultimate result of the consolidation of the rule of law,
extensively developed in the Americas due to the democratization
process.
In his welcoming letter to the seminar on "Judicial Review in
the Americas . . . and Beyond," Professor Robert S. Barker referred to the fact that, since the United States Supreme Court decision of Marbury v. Madison2 two hundred years ago, "judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutes has been an integral
part of the law and politics of the United States." To this we must
add that in a certain way, that has also been the situation in all
Latin American countries, particularly since democracy has been
reinforced in the political systems of our countries, even with all
its inconsistencies.
We must not forget when we talk about judicial review that,
above all, it is an institutional tool which is essentially linked to
democracy; democracy understood as a political system not just
reduced to the fact of having elected governments, but where
separation and control of power and the respect and enforcement
of human rights is possible through an independent and autonomous judiciary. And precisely, it has been because of this process
of reinforcement of democracy in Latin American countries that
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and other
* Paper prepared for the seminar on Judicial Review in the Americas ... and Beyond,
Duquesne University School of Law, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, November 10-11 2006.
** Professor, Central University of Venezuela, Columbia Law School, New York; VicePresident of the International Academy of Comparative Law, The Hague.
1. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 215 (Cambridge University Press 1989).
2. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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governmental actions has become an important tool in order to
guarantee the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, and
the respect of human rights. It is in this sense that judicial review
of the constitutionality of state acts has been considered as the
ultimate result of the consolidation of the rule of law, when precisely in a democratic system the courts can serve as the ultimate
guarantor of the Constitution, effectively controlling the exercise
3
of power by the organs of the state.
On the contrary, as happens in all authoritarian regimes even
having elected governments, if such control is not possible, the
same power vested, for instance, upon a politically controlled Supreme Court or Constitutional Court, can constitute the most
powerful and diabolical instrument for the consolidation of authoritarianism, the destruction of democracy, and the violation of
human rights. 4
Unfortunately, this is what has been happening in my country,
Venezuela, where after decades of democratic ruling through
which we constructed one of the most formally complete systems
of judicial review in South America, that same system has been
the instrument through which the politically controlled judiciary,
and particularly the subjected Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal, have been consolidating the authoritarian regime
we now have.
With this important warning, allow me to try to explain the
general trends governing the very comprehensive judicial review
system established in Venezuela, in many aspects, since the nineteenth century, and to try to classify it within a constitutional
comparative law framework.

I. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE VENEZUELAN SYSTEM
This guarantee can always be analyzed according to the criteria
established a few decades ago by Mauro Cappelletti 5 who, follow-

3. See Hans Kelsen, "La garantie juridictionnelle de la Constitution (La Justice constitutionnelle)," Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et a 1 '4tranger,T.
19 7 2 5 7
XLV, 1928, pp.
4. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, "Quis Custodiet ipsos Custodes: De la interpretaci6n
constitucional a la inconstitucionalidad de la interpretaci6n," VIII Congreso Nacional de
derecho Constitucional, Perd, Fondo Editorial 2005, Colegio de Abogados de Arequipa,
Arequipa, Sept. 2005, pp. 463-489.
5. See Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, Indianapolis,
1971; "El control judicial de la constitucionalidad de las leyes en el derecho comparado,"
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ing the trends of the so-called "North American" and "European"
systems, distinguished between the "diffuse" (decentralized) and
"concentrated" (centralized) methods of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. The former is exercised by all the
courts of a given country, while the latter is only assigned to a Supreme Court or to a court specially created for that purpose such
as a Constitutional Court or Tribunal.
In the diffuse, or decentralized, method, all the courts are empowered to judge the constitutionality of statutes, as is the case in
the United States of America, where the "diffuse method" 6 was
born. That is why it is also referred as the "American model," initiated with Marbury v. Madison 7 in 1803, later followed in many
countries with or without a common law tradition. It is called "diffuse" or decentralized because judicial control is shared by all
courts, from the lowest level up to the Supreme Court of the country. In Latin America, the only country that has kept the diffuse
method of judicial review as the only judicial review method available is Argentina. In other Latin American countries, the diffuse
8
method coexists with the concentrated method.
The "concentrated" or centralized method of judicial review, in
contrast with the diffuse method, empowers only one single court
to control the constitutionality of legislation, utilizing annulatory
powers. This can be achieved by a Supreme Court or a constitutional court created specially for that particular purpose. The concentrated or centralized system is also called the "Austrian" or
"European" model because it was first established in Austria in
1920, and later developed in Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and
France. This method has also been adopted in many Latin American countries, in some cases as the only form of judicial review
applied. 9 In other countries, as mentioned, it is applied conjunctly
with the diffuse method. 10
It has been this mixture, or parallel functioning, of the diffuse
and concentrated methods, which has given rise to what can be
Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de Mexico, No. 61, Mexico 1966. See also Allan R.
Brewer-Caras, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Cambridge University Press 1989).
6. See Mauro Cappelletti, "El control judicial de la constitucionalidad de las leyes en el
derecho comparado", Revista de la Facultadde Derecho de Mdxico, No. 61, M6xico 1966, p.
28.
7. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
8. Such is the case in Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peri and Venezuela.
9. This concentrated method of judicial review is the only method applied in Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay.
10. See supra note 8.
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considered the "Latin American" model of judicial review. This
model can be identified in Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Perfi and Venezuela.
On the one hand, all courts are entitled to decide upon the constitutionality of legislation by autonomously deciding upon a statute's inapplicability in a particular case, with inter partes efects;
and on the other hand, the Supreme Court or a Constitutional
Court or Tribunal has been empowered to declare the total nulity
of statutes contrary to the Constitution.1 1 The Venezuelan judicial review system is precisely one of the latter, combining the diffuse and the concentrated methods of judicial review since the
nineteenth century. 12
In effect, article 7 of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution 13 declares expressis verbis that its text is "the supreme law" of the land
and "the ground of the entire legal order." This provision assigns
to all judges the duty "of guaranteeing the integrity of the Constitution"14 with the power to decide not to apply a statute that is
deemed to be unconstitutional when deciding a concrete case. Article 335 of the Constitution also assigns the Supreme Tribunal of
Justice the duty of guaranteeing "the supremacy and effectiveness
of the constitutional rules and principles," as "the maximum and
final interpreter of the Constitution," with the duty to seek for "its
15
uniform interpretation and application."
Additionally, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice 16 is the "Constitutional Jurisdiction," exclusively
empowered to declare the nullity of certain state acts on the
grounds of their unconstitutionality, in particular, statutes and

11. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, "La jurisdicci6n constitucional en America Latina," in
Domingo Garcia Belaunde and Francisco FernAndez Segado, La jurisdicci6nconstitucional
en Iberoamdrica,Edit. Dickinson, Madrid 1997, pp. 117-61.
12. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El sistema mixto o integral de control de la constitucionalidaden Colombia y Venezuela, BogotA 1995; Manuel Arona Cruz, "El control de la constitucionalidad de los actos juridicos en Colombia ante el Derecho Comparado," in Archivo de
Derecho Publico y Ciencias de la Administraci6n,Vol. VII 1984-1985, Derecho Publico en
Venezuela y Colombia, Instituto de Derecho Publico, UCV, Caracas 1986, pp. 39-114; Allan
R. Brewer-Carias, El sistema de justiciaconstitucional en la Constitucidn de 1999, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000.
13. The text of the Constitution of 12-30-99 was initially published in Gaceta Oficial
No. 36.860 dated 12-30-99. Subsequently, it was published with corrections in Gaceta
Oficial No. 5.453 Extraordinary dated 03-24-00. See the comments in Allan R. BrewerCarias, La Constitucin de 1999, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2 Vols, Caracas
2004.
14. Art. 334.
15. Art. 335.
16. Art. 266, par. 1' y 336.
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other state acts issued in direct execution of the Constitution. 17
The Tribunal also is empowered to judge the unconstitutionality of
the omissions of the legislative organ. 18
Other state acts, such as administrative acts and regulations,
are also subject to judicial review by the "Administrative Jurisdiction." These courts are empowered to annul administrative acts
because of their illegality or unconstitutionality. 19
Also, according to article 29 of the Constitution, the courts have
a duty to protect all persons in their constitutional rights and
guaranties when deciding an action for protection, or "amparo."
Such an action can be brought before the court against any illegitimate harm or threat to such rights.
Based on all the aforementioned constitutional provisions, judicial review of constitutionality in Venezuela can be exercised not
only through the diffuse and concentrated methods, but also
through a variety of other means. 20 Judicial review may occur
through any of the following means:
(1) The diffuse method of judicial review of the constitutionality
of statutes and other normative acts, exercised by all courts;
(2) The concentrated method of judicial review of the constitutionality of certain state acts, exercised by the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice;
(3) The protection of constitutional rights and guarantees
through the actions for amparo;
(4) The concentrated method of judicial review of executive regulations and administrative actions, exercised by special courts controlling their unconstitutionality and illegality (contenciosoadminsitrativo);
(5) The judicial review powers to control the constitutionality of
legislative omissions;
(6) The concentrated judicial review power to resolve constitutional conflicts between the State organs;
(7) The protection of the Constitution through the abstract recourse for interpretation of the Constitution; and
17. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Instituciones Politicas y Constitucionales,Vol.VI, La
Justicia Constitucional, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1996, pp. 131 ff.; Allan R.
Brewer-Carias, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 190 (Cambridge University Press
1998); Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El control concentrado de la constitucionalidadde las leyes
(Estudiode Derecho Comparado),Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1994, p. 19.
18. Art. 336.
19. Art. 259C.
20. See decision No. 194 of the Constitutional Chamber dated Feb. 15, 2001, in Revista
de Derecho Pziblico, No. 85-88, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2001, pp. 416 ff.
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(8) The Constitutional Chamber's power to remove from ordinary courts jurisdiction over particular cases.
According to a long Venezuelan tradition that can be traced
back to the nineteenth century, 21 all the principles of the mixed or
comprehensive system of judicial review had been gathered in the
1999 Constitution.
II.

THE DIFFUSE METHOD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Since 1897, the Venezuelan Civil Procedure Code has regulated
the diffuse method of judicial review, 22 which is currently set forth
in article 20. This article prescribes:
In the case in which a law in force, whose application is requested, collides with any constitutional provision, judges
shall apply the latter with preference.
The principle of the diffuse method of judicial review also has
been more recently set forth in article 19 of the Criminal Procedure Organic Code, as follows:
Control of the Constitutionality. The control of the supremacy of the Constitution corresponds to the judges. In case that
a statute whose application is requested would collide with it,
the courts shall abide [by] the constitutional provision.
Based on this author's proposal, 2 3 article 334 of the 1999 Constitution consolidated the diffuse method of judicial review of the
constitutionality of legislation, 24 as follows:
21. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, "La justicia constitucional en la nueva Constituci6n,"
in Revista de Derecho Constitucional No. 1, Edigtorial Sherwood, Caracas Sep.-Dec. 1999,
pp. 35-44; Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El Sistema de justicia constitucional en la Constitucidn
de 1999, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000; Allan R. Brewer-Carias, "Standing
to raise constitutional issues in Venezuela," in Richard S. Kay (ed.), Standing to raise constitutional issues: comparativeperspectives, XVIth Congress of the InternationalAcademy of
Comparative Law, Acadgmie Internationalede Droit Compar6, Brisbane 2002, Bruylant,
Bruxelles 2005, pp. 67-92.
22. This was expressly established in the Civil Procedure Code of 1897. See Allan R.
Brewer-Carias, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 127 ff. (Cambridge University
Press 1989); Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Instituciones Politicasy Constitucionales,Vol. VI, La
Justicia Constitucional,Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1996, pp. 86 ff.
23. See the proposed draft for this article, in Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Debate Constituyente (Aportes a la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente), Vol. II, (9 Sept. - 17 Oct. 1999),
Caracas 1999, pp. 24-34.
24. For instance, as it previously happened in other countries like Colombia, in 1910
(art. 4); Guatemala, in 1965 (art. 204); Bolivia, in 1994 (art. 228); Honduras, in 1982 (art.
315) and Perd, in 1993 (art. 138). See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Debate Constituyente (Aportes a
la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente), Vol. 111(18 Oct.-30 Nov. 1999), Caracas 1999, pp. 94-105.
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In case of incompatibility between this Constitution and a law
or other legal provision, constitutional provisions shall be applied, corresponding to all courts in any case whatsoever, even
at their initiative, the pertinent decision.
Through this article, the diffuse method of judicial review acquired constitutional rank in Venezuela as a judicial power that
can even be exercised ex officio by all courts, 25 including the different Chambers of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. 26
This constitutional provision follows the general trends shown
in comparative law regarding the diffuse method: it is based on
the principle of constitutional supremacy, according to which unconstitutional acts are considered void and hold no value. Therefore, each and every judge is entitled to decide the unconstitutionality of the statute they are applying in order to resolve the case.
This power can be exercised at the judge's own initiative, or ex
officio. The decision of the judge has only an inter partes effect in
each specific case and, therefore, is declarative in nature. 27
The general judicial procedural system in Venezuela is governed
under the "by-instance principle," so that judicial decisions resolving cases on judicial review are subject to ordinary appeal. Therefore, the cases could only reach the Cassation Chambers of the
Supreme Tribunal through cassation recourses. 28 Because this
situation could lead to possible dispersion of the judicial decision
on constitutional matters, the 1999 Constitution specifically set
forth a corrective procedure. The Constitution granted the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice the power to
review final judicial decisions issued by the courts of the Republic
on amparo suits and when deciding judicial review of statutes in
the terms established by the respective organic law. 29
Regarding this provision, it must be pointed out that it is neither an appeal nor a general second or third procedural instance.
Instead, it is an exceptional faculty of the Constitutional Chamber
to review, upon its judgment and discretion, through an extraor25. This has been a feature of the Venezuelan system. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias,
Instituciones Politicas y Constitucionales, Vol. VI, La Justicia Constitucional, op. cit., p.
101.
26. See decision No. 833 of the Constitutional Chamber dated Feb. 25, 2001, Case:
Instituto Aut6nomo de Policia Municipal de Chacao, in Revista de Derecho Piiblico, No. 8588,Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2001, pp. 369-71.
27. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 127 ff.(Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
28. Arts. 312 and ff. CCP.
29. Art. 336, 10C.
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dinary recourse, similar to a writ of certiorari. Such review is exercised against last instance decisions in which constitutional issues are decided by means of judicial review, or in amparo suits.
It is a reviewing, non-obligatory power that can be exercised optionally. 30 The Constitutional Chamber is empowered to choose
the cases it considers convenient to decide due to the constitutional importance of the matter. The Chamber also has the power
to give a general binding effect to its interpretation of the Consti31
tution, similar to the effect of stare decisis.
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Chamber has distorted its review power regarding judicial decisions, extending it far beyond
the precise cases of judicial review and amparo established in the
Constitution. The Chamber has extended its review power over
any other judicial decision issued in any matter when it considers
it contrary to the Constitution - a power that the Chamber has
proceeded to exercise without any constitutional authorization,
even ex officio. For instance, the Chamber will step in and rule
that a judicial decision was contrary to the Constitutional Chamber's interpretation of the Constitution, or that a decision was affected by a grotesque error regarding constitutional interpretation. 32
III. THE CONCENTRATED METHOD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The second traditional method of judicial review in Venezuela is
the judicial power to annul unconstitutional statutes and other
state acts of similar rank, which has been granted exclusively to
the Supreme Court of the country since 1858. According to the
1999 Constitution, this power is now attributed to one of the
Chambers of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice - the Constitu33
tional Chamber - as Constitutional Jurisdiction.

30. In a certain way, the remedy is similar to the so-called writ of certiorari in the
North American system. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE
LAW 141 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). See the comments of Jesdis Maria Casal, Constituci6n y JusticiaConstitucional,Caracas 2003, p. 92
31. Art. 335.
32. See decision No. 93 of Feb. 6, 2001 (Case: Olimpia Tours and Travel v. Corporaci6n
de Turismo de Venezuela), in Revista de Derecho Pzblico, No. 85-88, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas 2001, pp. 414-15. See also Allan R. Brewer-Carias, "Quis Custodiet
ipsos Custodes: De la interpretaci6n constitucional a la inconstitucionalidad de la interpretaci6n," in VIII Congreso Nacional de derecho Constitucional, Perd, Fondo Editorial 2005,
Colegio de Abogados de Arequipa, Arequipa, septiembre 2005, pp. 463-89.
33. Arts. 266,1; 334 and 336 of the Constitution.
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This method of judicial review can be exercised in three ways:
(1) when the Chamber is requested through a popular action to
decide upon the unconstitutionality of statutes already in force, (2)
in some cases, in an obligatory way, or (3) when deciding on the
matter in a preventive way before the publication of the challenged statute. In all of these cases, the Constitutional Chamber
has the power to annul the unconstitutional challenged statutes
with erga omnes effects.
A.

The ConcentratedMethod of JudicialReview Through Popular Action

The second traditional method of exercising judicial review in
Venezuela has been the judicial power to annul statutes and other
state acts of similar rank issued in direct and immediate execution
of the Constitution. This power is granted solely to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, as the Constitutional Jurisdiction. 34
According to article 334 of the Constitution of 1999, following a
tradition that began in 1858, 35 the Court retains competence in
the following matters:
[To] [d]eclare the nullity of the statutes and other acts of the
organs exercising public power issued in direct and immediate
execution of the Constitution or being ranked equal to a law,
[which] corresponds exclusively to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.
This judicial review power to annul state acts on the grounds of
their unconstitutionality refers to: (1) National laws or statutes
and other acts which have the force of laws; (2) State constitutions
and statutes, municipal ordinances, and other acts of the legislative bodies issued in direct and immediate execution of the Constitution; (3) State acts with rank equal to statutes issued by the National Executive; and (4) State acts issued in direct and immediate
execution of the Constitution by any State organ exercising the
public power.
Since the 1858 Constitution, constitutional jurisdiction was as36
signed to the Supreme Court of Justice in Plenary Session.
34. Id.
35. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Instituciones Politicasy Constitucionales, Vol. VI La
JusticiaConstitucional,Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1996, pp. 131 ff.
36. Id.
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Therefore, one of the novelties of the 1999 Constitution was to assign constitutional jurisdiction to just one of the Chambers of the
Supreme Court of Justice - the Constitutional Chamber. 37 This
chamber, like all of the other chambers, has the mission of:
Guaranteeing the supremacy and effectiveness of the constitutional rules and principles: it shall be the last and maximum interpreter of the Constitution and guardian of its stan38
dard interpretation and application.
The specificity of the Constitutional Chamber in these cases, according to article 335 of the Constitution, is that:
The interpretations made by the Constitutional Chamber on
the content or the scope of the constitutional rules are binding
[on] the other Chambers of the Supreme Court and other
courts of the Republic.
The most important feature of the concentrated method of judicial review under the Venezuelan system is that the standing necessary to raise an action resides in all individuals, being an actio
popularis.39 Consequently, according to article 5 of the Organic
Law of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, any individual or corporation with legal capacity is entitled to file a nullification action
against the abovementioned state acts on grounds of the act's unconstitutionality. 40
According to the doctrine of the Supreme Tribunal, the objective
of the popular action is that anybody has the necessary standing
to sue. 41 On August 22, 2001, the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Tribunal ruled:
any individual having capacity to sue has procedural and legal interest to raise [the popular action], without requiring a
concrete historical fact [of] harm [to] the plaintiffs private legal sphere. The claimant is a guardian of the constitutionality
and that guardianship entitles him to act, whether [or not] he
37. Arts. 262; 266,1.
38. Art. 335, first paragraph.
39. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Instituciones Politicas y Constitucionales, Vol. VI La
Justicia Constitucional,Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1996, pp. 137 ff.
40. Id. at 144.
41. According to this criterion, therefore, as the Supreme Court in Plenary Session has
said, the popular action "may be exercised by any and all citizens with legal capacity."
Decision dated Nov. 19, 1985, in Revista de Derecho Pdblico, No. 25, Editorial Juridica
Venezolana, Caracas 1986, p. 131.
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suffered a harm from the unconstitutionality of a law. This
kind of popular action is exceptional. 42
This concentrated method of judicial review has traditionally
been used in an extensive way, particularly by states and municipalities against national statutes, and conversely, by the Federal
government against state and municipal legislation. Also, individuals have used this method against national, state and municipal statutes for the protection of individual rights.
B.

The Obligatory ConcentratedMethod of JudicialReview of the
"State of Exception" Decrees

Under the concentrated method of judicial review, particular
emphasis must be made regarding the "state of exception" decrees
that can be issued by the President of the Republic. Pursuant to
article 339 of the Constitution, these executive decrees declaring a
"state of emergency" shall be submitted by the President of the
Republic before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal in order for its constitutionality to be reviewed. Additionally, article 336,6 set forth that the Constitutional Chamber is
entitled to, "Review, in any case, even ex officio, the constitutionality of decrees declaring states of exception issued by the President
43
of the Republic."
This judicial power of obligatory judicial review is also a novelty
introduced by the 1999 Constitution. This model followed the
precedent of Colombia, 44 but added the Constitutional Chamber's
power to exercise judicial review ex officio.
By exercising this control, the Constitutional Chamber can decide not only the constitutionality of the decrees declaring "states
of exception," but also the constitutionality of its content. This
control is exercised pursuant to the provisions of article 337 and
the Constitution. In particular, in case of restriction of constitutional guaranties, the Chamber must verify that the decree effectively contains a regulation regarding "the exercise of the right
45
whose guarantee is restricted."

42.
No. 83,
43.
44.
45.

Decision No. 1077, Case: Servio Tulio Le6n Briceho, in Revista de Derecho Pablico,
Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000, pp. 247 ff.
Art. 336,6.
Art. 241,7.
Art. 339.
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In addition to the actio popularis and these cases of obligatory
review, the concentrated method of judicial review can also be exercised by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal in
a preventive way regarding statutes that have been sanctioned
but are not yet published. This preventive control can occur in
three cases established as an innovation in the 1999 Constitution:
(1) cases regarding international treaties, (2) cases involving organic laws, and (3) cases regarding non-promulgated statutes, at
the request of the President of the Republic.
In the traditional system of judicial review in Venezuela, the
sole mechanism of preventive concentrated judicial review of statutes was the Supreme Tribunal of Justice's power to decide the
unconstitutionality of a statute that is already sanctioned, but not
46
yet promulgated because of a presidential veto.
Presently, the Constitution of 1999 has expanded preventive
control of constitutionality to cover treaties, organic laws, and
non-promulgated statutes when requested by the President of the
Republic.
1.

Preventive JudicialReview of InternationalTreaties

With regard to international treaties, there is the preventive judicial review method, foreseen in article 336,5 of the Constitution,
which grants the Constitutional Chamber faculty to:
Verify, at the President of the Republic's or the National Assembly's request, conformity with the Constitution of the international treaties subscribed by the Republic before their
ratification.
It is important to point out that this provision originated in the
47
European constitutional systems, like those existing in France
and Spain, and subsequently adopted in Colombia. 48 This system
is now incorporated in the Venezuelan system of judicial review,
and permits the preventive judicial review of international trea-

46. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias Instituciones Politicas y Constitucionales, Vol. VI La
JusticiaConstitucional, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1996, pp. 134 ff.
47. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Implicaciones constitucionales de los procesos de integraci6n regional, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1998, pp. 75 ff.
48. Id. at 590.
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ties subscribed by the Republic, thereby avoiding the possibility of
subsequent challenge of the statutes approving the treaty.
In this case, if the treaty turns out not to be in conformity with
the Constitution, it cannot be ratified, and an initiative for constitutional reform to adapt the Constitution to the treaty may result.
On the other hand, if the Constitutional Chamber decides that the
international treaty conforms to the Constitution, then a popular
action of unconstitutionality against the approving statute could
not subsequently be raised.
2.

The Preventive JudicialReview of the OrganicLaws

The second mechanism of the preventive judicial review method
refers to organic laws. According to article 203 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Chamber must decide, before their promulgation, the constitutionality of the "organic" character of the organic laws when qualified this way by the National Assembly.
Article 203 of the Constitution defines the organic laws in five
senses: (1) those the Constitution itself qualifies as such; 49 (2) the
organic laws issued in order to organize public branches of government (Public Powers); 50 (3) those intended to "develop the constitutional rights," which implies that all laws issued to develop
the content of articles 19 to 129 shall be organic laws; (4) those

49. This happens in the following cases: Organic Law of Frontiers (art. 15); Organic
Law of Territorial Division (art. 16); Organic Law of the National Armed Force (art. 41);
Organic Law of the Social Security System (art. 86); Organic Law for the Land Planning
(art. 128); Organic Law Establishing the Limits to Public Officer's Emoluments (art. 147);
Organic Law of Municipal Regime (art. 169); Organic Law on the Metropolitan Districts
(arts. 171 and 172); Organic Law Ruling Officers Ineligibility (art. 189); Organic Law Concerning the Nationalization of Activities, Industries or Services (art. 302); Organic Law of
the Nation Defense Council (art. 232); Organic Law Ruling the Remedy of Reviewing Decisions Adopted on Actions of Amparo and on Diffuse Judicial Review (art. 336); Organic Law
of State of Emergency (art. 338 and Third, 2 Transitional clause); Organic Law on Refugees
and Asylum (Fourth, 2 Transitional clause); Organic Law on the Peoples Defendant (art, 5
Transitional clause); Organic Law on Education (Sixth Transitional clause); Organic Law
on Indian Peoples (Seventh Transitional clause); Labor Organic Law (Fourth, 3 Transitional clause); Labor Procedural Organic Law (Fourth, 4 Transitional clause); Tributary
Organic Code (Fifth Transitional clause).
50. Such as the Organic Law of the Public Administration (art. 236, paragraph 20);
Organic Law of the Attorney General for the Republic (art. 247); Organic Law of the Judicial Power, Organic Law of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (art. 262); Organic Law of the
Electoral Power (art. 292 and Eighth Transitional clause); Organic Law of the Citizen
Power, comprising the Organic Law of the General Controller of the Republic, Organic Law
of the General Prosecutor of the Republic and Organic Law of the Peoples Defender (Ninth
Transitional clause); Organic Law of Municipal regime (art. 169 and First Transitional
clause); Organic Law ruling the States Legislative Councils (art. 162).
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organic laws issued to "frame other laws;" 51 and (5) those organic
laws named "organic" by the National Assembly, when they are
admitted by two-thirds vote of the present members before initiating the discussion.
This last case of laws, qualified as such by the National Assembly, are those that shall be automatically sent, before their promulgation, to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal
of Justice. The Tribunal will make a decision regarding the constitutionality of the laws' organic character.
3.

JudicialReview of Statutes Sanctioned Before Their
Promulgation

The third mechanism of preventive judicial review of constitutionality set forth in article 214 of the Constitution is established
in cases when the President of the Republic raises before the Constitutional Chamber the constitutional issue against sanctioned
statutes before their promulgation. 52 Thus, control over the constitutionality of sanctioned but not promulgated statutes is set
forth in a different way than the traditional so-called "presidential
veto" of statutes, which involves a devolution to the National Assembly. 53
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW THROUGH THE ACTION FOR AMPARO OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES

Beside the classical diffuse and concentrated methods of judicial
review, with the aforementioned variations, in Venezuela, as in all
other Latin American countries, there is a third method of judicial
review. This method is a specific action established in the Constitution for protection of constitutional rights, which can also serve
to control the constitutionality of statutes and other governmental
actions applicable to the case.
The action or suit for protection, or amparo, as a specific judicial
means for the protection of all constitutional rights and guarantees 54 has been constitutionalized in Venezuela since the 1961
51. For example, the Taxation Organic Code that shall frame all specific tax laws, or
the Organic Law on the Financial Administration of the State that shall frame the annual
or pluri-annual budget laws, or the specific laws referred to public credit operations.
52. The Constitutional Chamber considered that it is an exclusive standing of the
President of the Republic. See decision No. 194 of Feb. 15, 2001.
53. Art. 214 of the Constitution.
54. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Instituciones Politicasy Constitucionales, Vol. V, Derecho y la Accidn de Amparo, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1998, pp. 19 ff.

Spring 2007

Judicial Review in Venezuela

4
453

Constitution. This provision implies the obligation of all the
courts to protect persons in the exercise of their constitutional
rights and guarantees. In the amparo suit decisions, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation can also be exercised by
the courts as part of their rulings.
Article 27 of the Constitution of 1999 establishes:
Every individual is entitled to be protected by the courts in
the enjoyment and exercise of rights, even those which derive
from the nature of man that are not expressly set forth in this
Constitution or in the international treaties on human rights.
The amparo suit is governed by an informal, oral proceeding
that shall be public, brief and free of charge. The judge is entitled
to immediately restore the affected legal situation, and the court
shall issue the decision with preference to all other matters.
As per the Organic Law on Amparo of Constitutional Rights and
Guarantees of 1988, 55 in principle, all courts of first instance are
competent to decide amparo suits.
Standing to file the action of amparo corresponds to every indi56
vidual whose constitutional rights and guarantees are affected
- even those inherent rights that are not expressly provided for
in the Constitution or in the international treaties on human
rights that are ratified by the Republic. In Venezuela, such treaties rank on the same level as the Constitution, and they even
prevail in the internal order as long as they establish more favorable rules on the enjoyment and exercise of rights than those es57
tablished under the Constitution and other laws.
In Venezuela, the action of amparo may be instituted against
state organs, against corporations and even against individuals
whose actions or omissions may infringe or threaten constitutional
rights and guarantees. In all cases of amparo proceedings, if the
alleged violation of the constitutional right involves a statutory

55. See Gaceta Oficial No. 33.891 dated Jan. 22, 1988. See generally Allan R. BrewerCarias & Carlos M. Ayala Corao, La Ley Orgdnica de Amparo sobre Derechos y Garantias
Constitucionales,Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1988.
56. Individual, political, social, cultural, educative, economic, Indian and environmental rights and their guarantees are listed in articles 19 through 129 of the Constitution.
In Venezuela, there exists no limitation established in other countries (e.g., Germany and
Spain), which reduces the action of amparo to protect just "fundamental rights." See Allan
R. Brewer-Carias, El Amparo a los derechos y garantiasconstitucionales(una aproximaci6n
comparativa),Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1993.
57. Art. 23C.
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provision, in his decision, the amparo judge can decide that the
statute is unconstitutional and not apply it to the case.
Generally, "the individual directly affected by the infringement
of the constitutional rights and guarantees" has standing in an
action for amparo.5 8 But by virtue of the constitutional acknowledgement of the legal protection of diffuse or collective interests,
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court has admitted
the possibility of exercising the action of amparo to enforce collective and diffuse rights. For instance, those rights related to an acceptable quality of life and also those pertaining to the political
rights of voters, admitting precautionary measures with erga om59
nes effects.
In such cases, the Constitutional Chamber has admitted that:
any individual with legal capacity to bring suit, who is going
to prevent damage to the population or parts of it to which he
belongs, is entitled to bring the [amparo] suit grounded in diffuse or collective interests .... This interpretation, based on
article 26, extends standing to companies, corporations, foundations, chambers, unions and other collective entities, whose
object be the defense of the society, as long as they act within
the boundaries of their corporate object, aimed at protecting
the interests of their members regarding their object.60

58. See, e.g., decision of the Constitutional Chamber dated Mar. 15, 2000, Revista de
Derecho Pdblico, No. 81, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000, pp. 322-23.
59. Decision of the Constitutional Chamber No. 483 of May 29, 2000 (Case: "Queremos
Elegir"y otros), Revista de Derecho Piblico, No. 82, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas
2000, pp. 489-91. See also decision of the same Chamber No. 714 of July 13, 2000 (Case:
APRUM), in Revista de Derecho Pdblico, No. 83, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas
2000, pp. 319 ff.
60. See decision of the Constitutional Chamber No. 487 of Apr. 6, 2001, Case: Glenda
L6pez, in Revista de Derecho Pdblico, No. 85-88, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas
2001, pp. 453 ff. In these cases, as stated by the Constitutional Chamber in a decision
dated February 17, 2000 (No. 1.048, Case: William 0. Ojeda 0. v. Consejo Nacional Electoral), in order to enforce diffuse or collective rights or interests, it is necessary that the
following elements be combined:
(1.) That the plaintiff sues based not only on his personal right or interest, but
also on a common or collective right or interest.
(2.) That the reason for the claim filed on the action of amparo'be the general
damage to the quality of life of all the inhabitants of the country or parts of it,
since the legal situation of all the members of the society or its groups has been
damaged when their common quality of life was unimproved.
(3.) That the damaged goods are not susceptible of exclusive appropriation by
one subject (such as the plaintiff).
(4.) That the claim concerns an indivisible right or interest that involves the
entire population of the country or a group of it [and] that a necessity of satisfying social or collective interests exists, before the individual ones.
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On the other hand, regarding the general defense and protection
of diffuse and collective interests, the Constitutional Chamber has
61
also admitted the standing of the Defender of the People.
In order to seek uniformity of the application and interpretation
of the Constitution, article 336 of the Constitution also grants the
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal the power to
review, in a discretionary way, all final decisions issued in amparo
suits. The extraordinary rcourse can also be raised against judicial decisions applying the diffuse method of judicial review, being
the review power of the Constitutional Chamber of facultative,
non-obligatory character.
V.

THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS AND OTHER NORMATIVE

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS

The fourth method of judicial review of constitutionality is the
concentrated method, also established in the Constitution, which
applies to executive regulations and other normative administrative actions. For such purposes, article 259 of the Constitution
sets forth the "Administrative Jurisdiction" exercised by Judicial
Action
(contenciosoof Administrative
Review
Courts
administrativo),in the following way:
The Administrative Jurisdiction corresponds to the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice and to the other courts determined by law.
See in Revista de Derecho Pdblico,No. 83, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000, pp.
375 ff.
61. The Chamber has granted the Peoples' Defender standing, by stating:
[T]o act to protect those rights and interests, when they correspond in general
to the consumers and users (6, article 281), or to protect the rights of Indian
peoples (paragraph 8 of the same article), since the defense and protection of
such categories is one of the faculties granted to said entity by article 281 of the
Constitution in force. It is about a general protection and not a protection of
individualities.
Within this frame of action, and since the political rights are included in the
human rights and guarantees of Title III of the Constitution in force, which [offer] general projection . . . it must be concluded that the Defender of the People
is entitled on behalf of society to [file] suit [for] an action of amparo tending to
control the Electoral branch of government, [for each] citizen's benefit, in order
to enforc[e] articles 62 and 70 of the Constitution, which were denounced ... by
the National Legislative Assembly . . . ([including the] right to citizen participation).
See decision of the Constitutional Chamber No. 487 of Apr. 6, 2001, Case: Glenda L6pez, in
Revista de Derecho Ptiblico, No. 85-88, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2001, pp.
453 ff.
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The courts of the Administrative Jurisdiction have the power
to annul general or individual administrative acts contrary to
law, even because of deviation of power. Additionally, the
courts may condemn the Administration to pay compensation
of damages caused because of the Administration liability; decide claims for the fulfillment of public services and arrange
what is necessary to restore the subjective legal situation
damaged by the activity of the Administration.
Therefore, pursuant to this constitutional article, judicial review
also corresponds to the courts of Administrative Jurisdiction when
exercising their faculty of annulment of administrative acts, when
contrary to statutes, executive regulations or other sources of administrative law. 6 2 Similar to judicial review of constitutionality,
decisions annulling administrative acts, both normative and spe63
cific ones, have erga omnes effects.
The difference between the "Constitutional Jurisdiction" (Jurisdicci6n Constitucional), attributed to the Constitutional Chamber
of the Supreme Court of Justice, and the "Administrative Jurisdiction" (Jurisdicci6ncontencioso-administrativo),attributed to the
special courts for judicial review of administrative actions, 64 resides in the state acts subjected to control. On the one hand, Constitutional Jurisdiction is in charge of nullifying actions against
unconstitutional statutes and other acts of similar rank or issued
in direct and immediate execution of the Constitution. On the
other hand, Administrative Jurisdiction is in charge of deciding
nullity actions against unconstitutional or illegal administrative
acts or regulations.
Therefore, as per article 266,5 of the Constitution, the PoliticoAdministrative Chamber of the Supreme Court is entitled:
To declare the total or partial nullity of bylaws (regulations)
and other general or individual administrative acts of the National Executive ....
Regarding the standing to challenge administrative acts on the
grounds of unconstitutionality and illegality, when referring to
62. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Instituciones Politicasy Constitucionales, Vol. VII, La
Justicia Contencioso-Administrativa,Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1997, pp. 26
ff.
63. Id.
64. See the author's proposal before the National Constituent Assembly. See Allan R.
Brewer-Carias, Debate Constituyente (Aportes a la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente), Vol.
II, (9 Sept. - 17 Oct. 1999), Caracas 1999, pp. 245 ff.
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normative administrative acts or regulations, anybody can bring
an action before the Court by means of the popular action of nullity. Consequently, a simple interest in the legality or constitutionality is enough for any citizen to be sufficiently entitled to
raise the nullity action for unconstitutionality or illegality against
regulations and other normative administrative acts. 65 This simple interest has been defined by the First Administrative Court, in
a decision dated March 22, 2000, as "the general right granted by
law upon every citizen to access the competent courts to raise the
nullity of an unconstitutional or illegal administrative general
act."

66

As to the administrative acts of particular effects, the standing
to challenge such acts before the Administrative Jurisdiction
courts corresponds solely to those who have a personal, legitimate
and direct interest in the annulment of the act. 67 This has been
the general rule on the matter even though some decisions have
been issued by the Politico-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal, giving standing to any person with only a legitimate interest.68
Additionally, in the case of the Administrative Jurisdiction,
even before the new Constitution took effect in 1999, the possibility of protecting collective interests was also made available. In
particular, it is now widely accepted that a collective or diffuse
right exists against city-planning acts.69
Nonetheless, despite very impressive advances regarding judicial review of administrative actions experienced in the past decades, due to the political control of the Judiciary during the past
seven years, the role of the Administrative Jurisdiction in controlling Public Administration has dramatically diminished in Venezuela, affecting the rule of law. 70
65. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Instituciones Politicasy Constitucionales, Vol. VII, La
Justicia Contencioso-Administrativa,Caracas 1997, pp. 74 ff.
66. See decision of the First Administrative Court dated Mar. 22, 2000, Case: Banco de
Venezolano de Cridito v. Superintendencia de Bancos, Revista de Derecho Pdblico, No. 81,
Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000, pp. 452-53.
67. Art. 5, Law.
68. See decision of the Supreme Court of Justice in Politico-Administrative Chamber of
Apr. 13, 2000, Case: Banco Fivenez v. Junta de Emergencia Financiera,Revista de Derecho
Ptiblico, No. 82, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas, 2000, pp. 582-83.
69. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Instituciones Politicasy Constitucionales, Vol. VII, La
Justicia Contencioso-Administrativa,Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1997, pp. 130
ft.
70. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, "La progresiva y sistemdtica demolici6n institucional
de la autonomia e independencia del Poder Judicial en Venezuela 1999-2004," en el libro:
XXX Jornadas J.M. Dominguez Escovar, Estado de derecho, Administraci6n de justicia y
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VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS
The fifth judicial review method established in the 1999 Constitution refers to legislative omissions, empowering the Constitutional Chamber to review the unconstitutional omissions of the
legislative organ. 7 1 This is another new institution in matters of
judicial review established by the 1999 Constitution. In Article
336, the Constitution grants the Constitutional Chamber faculty:
To declare the unconstitutionality of municipal, state or national legislative organ omissions, when they failed to issue
indispensable rules or measures to guarantee the enforcement
of the Constitution, or when they issued them in an incomplete way; and to establish the terms, and if necessary, the
guidelines for their correction.
This provision has given extended judicial power to the Constitutional Chamber, which surpasses the trends of the initial Portuguese antecedent on the matter, where only the President of the
Republic, the Ombudsman or the Presidents to the Autonomous
Regions had standing to require such decisions. 72 On the contrary, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 does not establish any
condition whatsoever for standing; whereby regarding normative
omissions, 7 3 standing has been treated similarly as in popular actions.
In many cases, the Chamber has been asked to rule on omissions of the National Assembly in sanctioning statutes, like the
Organic Law on Municipalities which, according to the Transitory
dispositions of the 1999 Constitution, was due to be sanctioned
within two years following its approval. Even though the Chamber issued two decisions in the case, the National Assembly failed
to sanction the statute until 2005. 74 In these cases, fortunately,
the Chamber has not itself decided (in this case to legislated) in
place of the legislative body, as it has done regarding the election
derechos humanos, Instituto de Estudios Juridicos del Estado Lara, Barquisimeto, 2005,
pp. 33-174.
71. This institution has its origins in the Portuguese system. See Allan R. BrewerCarias, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 269 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
72. Id.
73. It has been called by the Constitutional Chamber: "legislative silence and the legislative abnormal functioning," decision No. 1819 of Aug. 8, 2000, of the PoliticoAdministrative Chamber, Case: Rene Molina v. Comisidn Legislativa Nacional.
74. See the reference in Allan R. Brewer-Carias et al, Ley Orgdnica del Poder Pzblico
Municipal, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2005.
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of the National Electoral Council. There, due to the failure of the
National Assembly to elect those members with the needed twothirds majority vote, the Constitutional Chamber, which has been
completely controlled by the Executive, directly appointed them in
violation of the Constitution. Through that decision, the Constitutional Chamber guaranteed the complete control of the Electoral
75
body by the Executive.
VII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES
BETWEEN THE STATE ORGANS

The sixth judicial review method refers to the power attributed
to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal to "decide
upon constitutional controversies aroused between any organ of
76
the branches of government (public power)."
This judicial review power refers to controversies between any
of the organs that the Constitution foresees, whether in the horizontal or vertical distribution of the public power. In particular,
"constitutional" controversies - those whose decision depends on
the examination, interpretation and application of the Constitution - refers to the distribution of powers between the different
state organs, especially those distributing the power between the
national, state and municipal levels.
The "administrative" controversies that can arise between the
Republic, the states, municipalities or other public entities are to
be decided by the Politico-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal 77 as an Administrative Jurisdiction.
As the Supreme Court of Justice specified, in order to identify
the constitutional controversy, it is required:
That the parties of the controversy are those who have been
expressly assigned faculties for those actions or provisions in
the constitutional text itself, that is, the supreme state insti-

75. See decisions No. 2073 of Aug. 4, 2003 (Case: Hermdnn Escarrd Malaver y otros)
and No. 2341 of August 25, 2003 (Case: Hermdnn Escarrd M. y otros) in Allan R. BrewerCarias, La Sala Constitucional versus el Estado Democrdtico de Derecho. El secuestro del
poder electoral y de la Sala Electoral del Tribunal Supremo y la confiscaci6n del derecho a
la participaci6npolitica, Los Libros de El Nacional, Colecci6n Ares, Caracas 2004, p. 172;
"El secuestro del Poder Electoral y la confiscaci6n del derecho a la participaci6n politica
mediante el referendo revocatorio presidencial: Venezuela 2000-2004," in Boletin Mexicano
de Derecho Comparado,Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico, No. 112. M6xico, enero-abril 2005 pp. 11-73.
76. Art. 336.
77. Art. 266, para. 4'.
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tutions, whose organic regulation is set forth in the constitutional text, different from others, whose concrete institutional
frame is established by the ordinary legislator....
On the contrary, "we are not in [the] presence of a constitutional
controversy when the parties to same are not organs of the
branches of government (public power), with attributes estab78
lished in the constitutional text."
In any case, the standing to raise a remedy in order to settle a
constitutional controversy only corresponds to one of the branches
79
of government (public power) party to the controversy.
VIII. RECOURSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Finally, regarding the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Chamber, mention must be made of the faculty to decide abstract recourses of interpretation of the Constitution. This is a judicial
means that the Constitutional Chamber has created from the interpretation of article 335 of the Constitution, which grants the
Supreme Tribunal the character of "maximum and final interpreter of the Constitution."
In effect, the 1999 Constitution only grants the Supreme Tribunal of Justice power to "decide the recourses of interpretation on
the content and scope of the legal texts,"8 0 a faculty that is to be
exercised "by the different Chambers [of the Tribunal] pursuant to
the provisions of this Constitution and the law."8 1 No reference is
made in the Constitution to recourse for the interpretation of the
Constitution itself.
Nonetheless, before the Supreme Tribunal of Justice Organic
Law was sanctioned in 2005, and without any constitutional or
legal support, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal created an autonomous "recourse of interpretation of the Constitution."8 2 The court's ruling was founded on article 26 of the
Constitution, which established the right to access justice, from
which it was deduced that although said action was not set forth
78. Decision of the Politico-Administrative Chamber No. 1468 of June 27, 2000, in
Revista de Derecho Pdblico, No. 82, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000, pp. 744 ff.
79. See dissenting vote of Justice Hdctor Pefia Torrelles, Case: Josg Amando Mejia y
otros (Decision Feb. 1, 2000).
80. Art. 266,6.
81. Art. 266C.
82. Decision No. 1077 of the Constitutional Chamber dated Sept. 22, 2000, Case: Servio
Tulio Ledn Briceo, in Revista de Derecho Ptiblico, No. 83, Editorial Juridica Venezolana,
Caracas 2000, pp. 247 ff.
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in any statute, it was not forbidden, either. Therefore, it was decided that "citizens do not require statutes establishing the recourse for constitutional interpretation, in particular, to raise it."83
In order to raise this recourse for constitutional interpretation,
the Constitutional Chamber has nonetheless considered that a
particular interest shall exist in the plaintiff. The court ruled
that:
a public or private person shall have a current legitimate legal interest, grounded in a concrete and specific legal situation, which necessarily requires the interpretation of constitutional rules applicable to the case, in order to cease the uncertainty impeding the development and effects of said legal
8 4
situation.
In decision No. 1077 dated August 22, 2001, the Constitutional
Chamber ruled that:
The purpose of such recourse for constitutional interpretation
would be a declaration of certainty on the scope and content of
a constitutional provision, and would form an aspect of citizen
participation, which may be made as a step prior to the action
of unconstitutionality, since the constitutional interpretation
could clear doubts and ambiguities about the supposed collision. It is about a preventive guardianship [of the Constitution].
The Chamber added that the petition for interpretation might
be inadmissible "if it does not specify which is the obscurity, ambiguity or contradiction between the provisions of the constitutional
text."8 5 The petition, if applicable, must also specify "the nature
and scope of the applicable principles," or "the contradictory or
ambiguous situations aroused between the Constitution and the
rules of its transitory regime."8 6 The interpretation of the Constitution made by the Constitutional Chamber in these cases has
87
binding effects.
83. This criterion was ratified later in decision (No. 1347 dated Sept. 11, 2000), in Revista de Derecho Ptiblico, No. 84, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000, pp. 264 ff.
84. Id.
85. Case: Servio Tulio Le6n Briceho, in Revista de Derecho Ptiblico, No. 83, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000, pp. 247 ff.
86. Id.
87. Decision No. 1347 of the Constitutional Chamber dated Nov. 9, 2000, in Revista de
Derecho Ptiblico, No. 84, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2000, pp. 264 ff.
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This extraordinary interpretive power, although theoretically an
excellent judicial means for the interpretation of the Constitution,
unfortunately has been extensively abused by the Constitutional
Chamber to distort important constitutional provisions, to interpret them in a way contrary to the text, or to justify constitutional
solutions according to the will of the Executive. This was the case,
for instance, with the various Constitutional Chamber decisions
regarding the consultative and repeal referendums between 2002
and 2004, where the Chamber confiscated and distorted the peoples' constitutional right to political participation 88
IX. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER'S POWER TO TAKE AWAY
JURISDICTION FROM LOWER COURTS IN PARTICULAR CASES

Finally, mention must be made to the figure of the "avocamiento," that is, the authority of the Constitutional Chamber to
remove cases from the jurisdiction of lower courts, at any stage of
the procedure, in order for the cases to be decided by the Chamber
itself.
This extraordinary judicial power was initially established in
the 1976 Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice as a competence attributed only to the Politico-Administrative Chamber of
the Supreme Court, which the Chamber used in a self-restricted
way.89 However, the Constitutional Chamber has now assumed
for itself the avocamiento power in matters of amparo cases,9 0 and
eventually annulled the former Organic Law provision. 91

88. See decisions No. 1139 of June 5, 2002 (Case: Sergio Omar Calder6n Duque y William Ddvila Barrios); No. 137 of Feb. 13, 2003 (Case: Freddy Lepage y otros); No. 2750 of
Oct. 21, 2003 (Case: Carlos E. HerreraMendoza); No. 2432 of Aug. 29, 2003 (Case: Luis
Franceschiy otros); and No. 2404 of Aug. 28, 2003 (Case: Exssel Alt Betancourt Orozco,
Interpretaci6ndel articulo 72 de la Constituci6n), in Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La Sala Constitucional versus el Estado Democrdtico de Derecho. El secuestro del poder electoral y de la
Sala Electoral del Tribunal Supremo y la confiscaci6n del derecho a la participacidnpolitica, Los Libros de El Nacional, Colecci6n Ares, Caracas 2004, p. 172; "El secuestro del Poder
Electoral y la confiscaci6n del derecho a la participaci6n politica mediante el referendo
revocatorio presidencial: Venezuela 2000-2004," in Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico, No.
112. M6xico, enero-abril 2005, pp. 11-73.
89. See Roxana Orihuela, El avocamiento de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 1998.
90. See decision No. 456 of Mar. 15, 2002 (Case: Arelys J. Rodriguez v. Registrador
Subalterno de Registro Pdblico, Municipio Pedro Zaraza, Estado Carabobo), in Revista de
Derecho Pdblico, No. 89-92, Editorial Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2002.
91. See decisibn No. 806 of Apr. 24, 2002 (Case: Sindicato Profesionalde Trabajadores
al Servicio de la Industria Cementera), in Revista de Derecho Piblico, No. 89-92, Editorial
Juridica Venezolana, Caracas 2002, pp. 179 y ss.
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In 2004, the new Organic Law of the Supreme Tribunal granted
to all the Chambers of the Tribunal a general power to remove
cases from the jurisdiction of lower courts, ex officio or through a
92
party petition, and when convenient, to decide the cases.
This power has been highly criticized as a violation of due process rights, and particularly, the right to a trial on a by-instance
basis by the courts. It has allowed the Constitutional Chamber to
intervene in any kind of process, including cases being tried by the
other Chambers of the Supreme Tribunal, with very negative effects. 93 For instance, this Constitutional Chamber power was
used to annul a decision issued by the Electoral Chamber of the
Supreme Tribunal, 94 which protected the citizens' rights to political participation. There, the Electoral Chamber suspended the
effects of a National Electoral Council decision, 95 objecting to the
presidential repeal referendum petition of 2004.
In this way, 96 the Constitutional Chamber interrupted the process which was normally developing before the Electoral Chamber
of the Supreme Tribunal, took the case away from that Chamber,
and annulled its ruling. Instead, the Constitutional Chamber decided the case according to the will of the Executive, restricting
the peoples' right to participate through petitioning referen97
dums.
CONCLUSION

As abovementioned, judicial review has played a very important
role in the contemporary world and can be considered as the ultimate result of the consolidation of the rule of law. Judicial review
92. Arts. 5,1,48; and 18,11.
93. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, "Quis Custodiet ipsos Custodes: De la interpretacion
constitucional a la inconstitucionalidad de la interpretaci6n," in VIII Congreso Nacional de
derecho Constitucional, Perd, Fondo Editorial 2005, Colegio de Abogados de Arequipa,
Arequipa, Sept. 2005, pp. 463-89.
94. See decisions No. 24 of Mar. 15, 2004 ) (Exp. AA70-E 2004-000021; Exp. x-0400006); No. 27 of Mar. 29, 2004 (Case: Julio Borges, Cdsar Pgrez Vivas, Henry Ramos Allup,
Jorge Sucre Castillo, Ram6n Josg Medina Y Gerardo Blyde v. Consejo Nacional Electoral)
(Exp. AA70-E-2004-000021- AA70-V-2004-000006).
95. See resolution No. 040302-131 of Mar. 2, 2004.
96. See decision No. 566 of Apr. 12, 2004.
97. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La Sala Constitucional versus el Estado Democrdtico
de Derecho. El secuestro del poder electoral y de la Sala Electoral del Tribunal Supremo y
la confiscaci6n del derecho a la participaci6npolitica, Los Libros de El Nacional, Colecci6n
Ares, Caracas 2004; "El secuestro del Poder Electoral y la confiscaci6n del derecho a la
participaci6n politica mediante el referendo revocatorio presidencial: Venezuela 20002004," in Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado,Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas,
Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico, No. 112. Mxico, enero-abril 2005 pp. 11-73.
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can contribute to the consolidation of democracy, which ensures
control over the exercise of state powers and guarantees the respect of human rights. When exercised for those purposes, judicial
review powers are the most important instruments for a Supreme
Court or a Constitutional Tribunal to guarantee the supremacy of
the Constitution.
But when used against democratic principles for circumstantial
political purposes, the judicial review powers attributed to a Supreme Court or to a Constitutional Tribunal can constitute the
most powerful instrument for the consolidation of an authoritarian government.
Consequently, the provision of various methods of judicial review and the corresponding actions and recourses established in a
Constitution is not, alone, a guarantee of constitutionalism and of
the enjoyment of human rights. Nor does the mere existence of
such provisions guarantee that there will be control of state powers, particularly, that there will be the division and separation of
powers, which today still remains the most important principle of
democracy.
The most elemental condition for this control is inevitably the
existence of an independent and autonomous judiciary and, in
particular, the existence of adequate institutions for controlling
the constitutionality of state acts (Constitutional Courts or Supreme Tribunals) - institutions capable of controlling the exercise of political power and of annulling unconstitutional state acts.
Unfortunately, in Venezuela - notwithstanding the marvelous,
formal system of judicial review enshrined in the Constitution,
which I have intended to describe, combining all the imaginable
instruments and methods for that purpose - due to the concentration of all state power in the National Assembly and in the Executive branch of government, and due to the very tight political
control that is exercised over the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the
rule of law has been progressively demolished with the complicity
of the Constitutional Chamber. Consequently, the authoritarian
elements that were enshrined in the 1999 Constitution have been
progressively developed and consolidated, precisely through the
decisions of the Constitutional Chamber, weakening the democratic principle.
That is why, unfortunately, the politically controlled Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela,
instead of being the guarantor of constitutionalism, of democracy,
and of the rule of law, has instead been the a fagade of "constitu-
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tionality" or "legality," camouflaging the authoritarian regime we
now have installed in the country.

